Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Constitutional economics:Constitutional economics examines the relationship between economic systems and their underlying political and legal frameworks. It focusses on the (economic) effects of alternative constitutional rules and the emergence and modification of constitutional rules. See also Constitution, Laws, Law, Economy._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stefan Voigt on Constitutional Economics - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 202 Constitutional Economics/Voigt/Parisi: the economic analysis of constitutions, also known as "constitutional economics" or "constitutional political economy," is a young research program. Standard economics used to focus on the analysis of choices within rules, thus assuming rules to be exogenously given and fixed. Constitutional economics broadens this research program by analyzing the choice of rules, using the established method of economics, that is, rational choice. A. (…) normative branch: (…) is interested in legitimizing the state and its most basic rules by drawing solely on the self-interest of rational individuals. The normative approach is dominated by adherents to social contract theory. B. (…) positive branch: (…) is interested in explaining (1) the (economic) effects of alternative constitutional rules and (2) the emergence and modification of constitutional rules. Over the last dozen years, research into the effects of constitutions experienced a veritable boost, whereas research into the emergence of constitutions is still in its infancy. Def Constitution/public choice/Voigt: Constitutions are concerned with mechanisms for the production of public goods. By writing and adopting constitutions, societies are not deciding in any meaningful detail what sort of public goods they want to provide themselves with; rather, the constitutions contain provisions that are intended to be used for making those decisions. >Constitution/Constitutional economics. A. Normative constitutional economics: possible questions: 1) How should societies proceed in order to bring about constitutional Parisi I 203 rules that fulfill some criterion like being "just" or 'deficient"? (2) What contents should the constitutional rules have? (3) Which issues should be dealt with in the constitution - and which should be left to sub-constitutional choice? (4) What characteristics should constitutional rules have? and many more. Contractarian approach/Buchanan: the frame is based on social contract theory as developed most prominently by Hobbes. According to Buchanan (1987(1), p. 249), the purpose of this contractarian approach is justificatory in the sense that "it offers a basis for normative evaluation. >Contract theory/Buchanan, >Costs/Buchanan, >Consent/Constitutional economics, >Efficiency/constitutional economics. Parisi I 205 B. Positive constitutional economics: Persson and Tabellini (2003)(2) is a major contribution to Positive Constitutional Economics (PCE). They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely electoral system and form of government. >Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics, >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics. 1. Buchanan, J. M. (1987). "The Constitution of Economic Policy." American Economic Review 77: 243-250. 2. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Account- ability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Voigt, Stefan Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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> Counter arguments against Voigt
> Counter arguments in relation to Constitutional Economics
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27